Truth as an operator and as a predicate
Suppose we add to the propositional calculus a new unary operator, T, whose truth table is just the trivial one that leaves the truth value of its operand untouched. By adding to a standard axiomatization of the propositional calculus we completely fix the meaning of T. Moreover this is a consistent classical account of truth that gives us a kind of unrestricted “T-schema” for the truth operator. On the face of it, then, it seems that if we t

Rigid Designation
Imagine the following set up. There are two tribes, A and B, who up until now have never met. It turns out that tribe A speaks English as we speak it now. However, tribe B speaks English* – a language much like English except it doesn’t contain the names “Aristotle” or “Plato”, and contains two new names, “Fred” and “Ned”. Suppose now that these two tribes eventually meet and learn each others language. In particular tribe A and B come to agree that the following holds in the new expanded language: (1) necessarily, if Socrates was a philosopher, Fred was Aristotle and Ned was Plato, and (2) necessarily, if Socr

Links
A real post should be on the way soon. A few links in the meanwhile If you haven’t seen it already there is a petition about allocating research funds on the basis of “impact” rather than academic merit. Please sign. JC Beall points me to his new webpage. Lots of interesting looking papers. I know it’s done the rounds already but this xkcd comic really made me chuckle!